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In this Article, Messrs. Schwarcz and Rothman analyze the disquieting 
impact of civil forfeiture law on creditors' rights. The Article begins by 
describing the historical origins of civil forfeiture and its de.'elopment 
into current day law. The Article then explores the tension between for-
ftiture law and commercial and bankruptcy law by examining the effect 
of a forfeiture action on unsecured and undersecured creditors. The 
Article evaluates a recent model for balancing go.'ernmental and com-
merciallaw interests, and concludes by suggesting reforms to the present 
civil forfeiture scheme. 
INTRODUCTION 
We continue to be enormously troubled by the government's increas-
ing and virtually unchecked use of the civil forfeiture statutes and the 
disregard for due process that is buried in those statutes. I 
I N May 1992, the federal government commenced the third largest fed-eral civil forfeiture2 action in United States history3 against more than 
$400 million of the assets of John McNamara, a powerful New York real 
estate holder, car dealer, philanthropist, and leading Republican Party 
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1. United States v. All Assets of Statewide Auto Parts, Inc., 971 F.2d 896, 905 (2d 
Cir. 1992). 
2. The term "forfeiture" has been defined in the legal context as "[1]055 of some right 
or property as a penalty for some illegal act." Black's Law Dictionary 650 (6th ed. 1990). 
Under the existing federal statutory scheme, forfeitures may arise as a criminal action, 
such as under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), see 18 
U.S.C. § 1963 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), or as a civil action, see 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988 & 
Supp. IV 1992); 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Criminal forfeitures are in 
personam actions (actions against a named criminal defendant), where the forfeiture is an 
automatic consequence of the defendant's conviction. See United States v. Angiulo. 897 
F.2d 1169, 1210 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 845 (1990). Civil forfeitures, by contrast 
under the federal statutes, are in rem actions (actions against the property to be forfeited). 
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contributor. This forfeiture proceeding,4 initiated pursuant to the civil 
forfeiture provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986,s has had an 
enormous impact not only on McNamara but also on innocent unsecured 
and undersecured6 creditors, including major financial and banking insti-
tutions. The McNamara case is but one example in an alarming trend in 
which the federal government's application of civil forfeiture laws, 
although serving some beneficial purposes,7 is creating a regime of com-
mercial uncertainty and confusion. 
With forfeitures of this scale, the broad reach of the civil forfeiture 
statutes comes into direct conflict with the rights of innocent third par-
ties who engage in legitimate commercial dealings with the alleged 
wrongdoer, or with companies or assets traceable to the wrongdoer. 
Ironically, forfeiture of commercial assets is an inadvertent attack on pri-
vate property rights perpetrated by the very governmental officials who 
are sworn to protect and defend those rights. The underlying issue is 
how to balance the commercially reasonable expectations of third parties 
with the legitimate forfeiture interests of the government. 
The dollar value of assets subject to federal forfeiture actions has risen 
See James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 Cornell 
L. Rev. 768, 768 (1977). 
Civil forfeiture will be the primary focus of this Article, not only because of its increas-
ingly frequent use by the government, but also because it targets the "guilty property" 
without regard to the culpability of the property's owners. This does not mean that crim-
inal forfeiture actions do not share potential for some of the criticisms of civil forfeiture 
raised in this Article, but the fact that property is forfeited only as a consequence of a 
criminal conviction provides for certain meaningful checks on abuse of due process and 
general lack of formal procedures. 
3. See Thomas J. Lueck, Port Jefferson Auto Dealer Forfeits Most of His Assets, N.Y. 
Times, May 20, 1992, at BI, B5. The only larger civil forfeiture actions were Michael 
Milken's forfeiture of $900 million to the SEC and BCCl's forfeiture of $500 million to 
U.S. depositors and investors. See id. 
4. See United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 
16, 1992). The authors represent a major creditor in the McNamara proceeding, 
although the views expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors. 
5. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207-35 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 981). 
6. See infra note 193. References in this Article to unsecured claims will include the 
unsecured portions of undersecured claims. 
7. Civil forfeiture, if narrowly targeted at a wrongdoer, can serve many salutary 
purposes. For example, the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of 
New York, under the guidance of the United States Attorney Rudolph Giuliani, aggres-
sively utilized civil forfeiture to seize public housing dwellings of narcotic dealers, thus 
creating a safer living environment for low-income housing dwellers. See Harry 
Berkowitz & May Voboril, Campaign Trailers: Giuliani Ad Watch, Newsday, Aug. 15, 
1993, at 41. 
As this Article will show, some government prosecutors are abusing civil forfeiture by 
applying civil forfeiture statutes to certain classes of non-culpable third parties. The pres-
ent forfeiture system's gravest flaw is the seizure of property now in the hands of innocent 
third parties coupled with the lack of an effective process where these individuals' claims 
can be meaningfully heard and adjudicated. Because the application of civil forfeiture 
statutes is supplanting traditional methods of claim resolution in broad sweeping forfei-
ture actions, prosecutors should pause to reflect upon the impact this application has on 
commercial law and activity. 
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dramatically in recent years. As of September 30, 1990, the Department 
of Justice ("DO]"), the agency responsible for executing civil forfeiture 
actions, had a $478 million balance in its Assets Forfeiture Fund.8 By 
1993, the value of forfeited assets in the DO] inventory had grown to 
$1.8 billion, including 31,698 pieces of property, real and personal.9 This 
increased use of forfeiture by the DO] has led some observers to question 
whether "we are seeing fair and effective law enforcement or an insatiable 
appetite for a source for increased agency revenue." 10 
As the assets confiscated in forfeiture actions continue to grow, so too 
grow the concerns of the financial community as to the impact these 
drastic measures have on innocent third party creditors. This Article 
examines the expansion of forfeiture law into areas previously governed 
by traditional forms of commercial and bankruptcy law and the conflicts 
created thereby. The Article also examines two important policy ques-
tions ll raised by these conflicts. First, should forfeiture law permit the 
government to ignore commercial and bankruptcy laws that have devel-
oped over centuries? Second, if forfeiture law is to be applied in a com-
mercial context, how should the rights of innocent third parties be 
protected? In order properly to address these questions, however, it is 
first necessary to understand the origins and traditional uses of forfeiture 
law. 
I. ORIGINS AND USES OF FORFEITURE LAW 
This Part describes the historical origins of civil forfeiture, its statutory 
and case law development, and the fundamental elements of current day 
forfeiture law. 
A. Historical Origins 
Perhaps the most oft-cited source of forfeiture is the Biblical passage: 
"if an ox gore a man or a woman, that they die, the ox shall be surely 
8. See U.S. Dep't of Just., 1990 Ann. Rep. of the Dep't of Just. Asset Forfeiture 
Program, App. A at 39. 
9. See Steven L. Kessler, Tide is Turning in Federal Forfeiture Rulings, N.Y.L.J., 
Mar. 5, 1993, at 1, 8 n.1. 
10. United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801, 807 n.6 (8th Cir. 1992) (Beam, J., 
dissenting). 
11. When forfeiture laws were applied in the past-to seizures of specific assets used 
in crimes-the limited scope of these seizures was unlikely to raise significant policy is-
sues in the commercial arena. The seizure of an asset directly used in criminal activity, 
such as an automobile used by a drug dealer, probably will not affect an innocent com-
mercial party unless that party has a security interest in the automobile. And, as will be 
shown, forfeiture law generally respects the rights of secured parties. 
As the McNamara case illustrates, however, when the government uses forfeiture law 
to seize not only property used in criminal activity, but all of the assets of a company or 
affiliated group of companies owned or controlled by a wrongdoer, the government's 
claims can come into direct conflict with the rights of innocent parties who have commer-
cial dealings with these companies. 
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stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten.'J12 According to the Talmud's 
interpretation of this passage, the use of the phrase "and its flesh shall 
not be eaten" is intended as a prohibition against receiving benefit from 
the animal. This prohibition becomes effective from the moment the of-
fending animal is convicted, even prior to its stoning. 13 Thus, the Bibli-
cal source for the notion of forfeiture does not contemplate a scheme 
under which a governing body or agency benefits from the use of guilty 
property. 
Civil forfeiture also traces its roots to the historical notion of "deo-
dand."14 "Deodand" is derived from the Latin phrase "Deo Dandum," 
meaning "to be given to God."IS More precisely, deodand itself 
originated in pre-Judeo Christian practices. 16 These practices, similar to 
the Talmud's understanding of the "goring ox" passage, reflect the view 
that the instrument of death is accused and that religious atonement is 
required. A more expansive view, prevalent in medieval England, per-
ceived the deodand in the "double perspective of a 'religious expiation' 
and as a forfeiture or amercement similar in function to exactions by the 
Crown in various contexts and activities with the aim of increasing its 
revenues."17 Although deodand was initially confined to "guilty prop-
erty," the English kings later expanded deodand to include all property 
and chattels belonging to criminals, serving, in principle, as a type of 
"fine." 18 
Thus, as the English concept of "deodand" developed, it strayed from 
Biblical "forfeiture" in two important respects. First, English deodand 
theory contemplated that some benefit was to be derived from the guilty 
property rather than prohibiting "its flesh [from] be[ing] eaten."19 For 
example, under English common law, persons convicted of treason for-
feited all their property to the Crown, while convicted felons forfeited 
chattels to the Crown and escheated their real property to the lord.20 
Second, unlike its Biblical counterpart, the property subject to forfeiture 
12. Exodus 21:28. This passage is cited by virtually all sources on forfeiture. See, 
e.g., George c. Pratt & William B. Petersen, Civil Forfeiture in the Second Circuit, 65 St. 
John's L. Rev. 653, 654 (1991) (tracing the origins of forfeiture and analyzing its contin-
ued vitality); Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deo-
dands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion o/Sovereignty, 46 Temp. L.Q. 
169 (1973) (analyzing the history of sovereignty and forfeiture). 
13. See Talmud, Tractate Baba Kamma 41a. 
14. See Finkelstein, supra note 12, at 169. 
15. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 681 n.16 (1974). 
16. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1-38 (1881). 
17. Finkelstein, supra note 12, at 183. 
18. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680-81. 
19. Exodus 21:28. 
20. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 682. The forfeiture was enforced by the Court of 
the Exchequer in an in rem proceeding. This forfeiture to the Crown was premised upon 
the notion that a breach of the criminal law was an offense to the King's peace. See id. 
(citing 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *299). This aspect of forfeiture, more correctly 
known as attainder, also represented a British expansion of the forfeiture contemplated 
by the Bible. Under Biblical law, only those guilty of offenses against the King were 
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under English law was not limited to the felonious "instrument," but 
could include nearly all of the criminal's assets,21 
In America, civil forfeiture was until recently infrequently used. For-
feitures were largely disfavored, primarily because the government's 
seizure of private property was a leading source of tension between the 
former colonists and the British Crown.22 In fact, the United States Con-
stitution protects property not only through the Due Process Clause, 23 
but also through a specific limitation on the scope of forfeiture in the 
treason context. 24 
Forfeiture, however, did find limited use in early America, particularly 
in admiralty law.2s The First Congress, for example, adopted several 
pieces of maritime forfeiture legislation,26 which generally provided for 
the forfeiture of ships and cargo for evasion of customs duties and illegal 
slave trade.27 The Supreme Court repeatedly upheld the use of forfeiture 
in this context.28 
During the Civil War, forfeiture saw extensive use, initially in the con-
fiscation of rebels' property, and later in the confiscation of property of 
Southern sympathizers.29 The Supreme Court subsequently upheld for-
feiture under a broad construction of the government's military power.30 
Thus, American law's expansion of forfeiture beyond the concept of 
"guilty property" ironically parallels the English law expansion of forfei-
ture that was disdained by the American colonists. American courts, 
therefore, did not rely on deodand as a premise for using forfeiture, but 
subject to a forfeiture to the Crown. The property of other convicted or condemned 
felons reverted to their heirs. See Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin 48b. 
21. See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 680. In fact, it has been noted that deodand is 
probably a "misplaced" general principle of English forfeiture law, and in fact such an 
analogy was rejected by English courts. See Maxeiner, supra note 2. at 771-72. 
22. See Maxeiner, supra note 2, at 776-81. Moreover, both the English practice of 
"official seizure and forfeiture" and the British "general warrant," also known as "a writ 
of assistance," which was used by the British to search ships and allow for their ultimate 
seizure and forfeiture for violations of customs and revenue laws, have been cited as two 
of the most significant factors leading to the American Revolution. See United States v. 
92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1131-32 (1993) [hereinafter 92 Buena Vista Are. 
Ii], aff'g, 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991) [hereinafter 92 Buena Vista Al·e. J]. 
23. See U.S. Const. amend. V. 
24. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 3, ci. 2 (prohibiting "[f]orfeiture e.'tcept during the life 
of the person attainted"). 
25. This historical development may explain why modem forfeiture statutes still call 
for the application of admiralty law procedures to forfeiture actions. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 981(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); infra note 112. 
26. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663. 683 & nn.21-23 
(1974). 
27. See id. at 683. 
28. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 13 (1827). 
29. See Pratt & Petersen, supra note 12, at 658. 
30. See id. at 659. ("[T]he power to declare war involves the power to prosecute it by 
all means and in any manner in which war may be legitimately prosecuted. It therefore 
includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to dispose of it at 
the will of the captor.") (quoting Miller v. United States. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268. 305 
(1871». 
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rather created their own forfeiture regime.31 
B. Modern Civil Foifeiture Statutes 
Although less prominent in the century following the Civil War, forfei-
ture subsequently gained renewed acceptance as a powerful weapon in 
the modern war on drugs.32 The civil forfeiture provisions of the Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 197033 (the "1970 
Drug Control Act") empowered the federal government to seize property 
used in connection with illegal substances. Although initially confining 
the statute to the narcotics context, Congress has expanded the 1970 
Drug Control Act during the last two decades. In 1978, Congress 
amended the 1970 Drug Control Act to allow the seizure of proceeds 
from illegal drug activity.34 In 1984, Congress further amended the stat-
ute to allow for the forfeiture of all property, including real property 
traceable to the illegal activity.35 
The enactment of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 further expanded 
the scope of civil forfeiture to include the proceeds of money laundering 
activity.36 The 1990 amendments to that Act increased civil forfeiture's 
scope to include proceeds traceable to counterfeiting and other offenses 
affecting financial institutions.37 In 1992, Congress supplemented these 
categories of offenses,38 and further amended the statute to include prop-
erty traceable to motor vehicle theft.39 
Perhaps the most significant recent development in this area is Con-
gress' enactment of 18 U.S.C. section 984,40 a statute that applies U[i]n 
any forfeiture action in rem in which the subject property is cash, mone-
tary instruments in bearer form, funds deposited in an account in a finan-
cial institution ... or other fungible property.,,41 Under section 984, the 
31. See Maxeiner, supra note 2, at 771 & n.25. 
32. See Pratt & Petersen, supra note 12, at 664. 
33. See Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276-78 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 881). 
34. See Pub. L. No. 95-633, § 301(a), 92 Stat. 3777 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 881(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
35. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 306(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2050 (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.c. § 881(a)(7) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
36. See Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1366(a), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-35 (codified as amended 
at 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
37. See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2525(a), 104 Stat. 4789, 4874 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.c. § 981(a)(I)(C) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
38. See Pub. L. No. 102-393, § 638(d), 106 Stat. 1729, 1788 (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(I)(C). 
39. See Pub. L. No. 102-519, § 100(a), 106 Stat. 3385 (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(I)(F) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992». 
40. Pub. L. No. 102-550, § 1522(a), 106 Stat. 3672,4063 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 984 
(Supp. IV 1992». 
41. 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(1) (Supp. IV. 1992); see also United States v. All Funds Pres-
ently On Deposit Or Attempted To Be Deposited In Any Accounts Maintained At 
American Express Bank, No. CV-92-531O, 1993 WL 352099, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 
1993) (discussing the enactment and effect of § 984). 
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government need not "identify the specific property involved in the of-
fense that is the basis for the forfeiture,"42 and may seize "any identical 
property found in the same place or account as the property involved in 
the offense"43 which would be subject to forfeiture had it remained in 
such place or account. Thus, Congress has not only dramatically in-
creased the number of crimes that support a forfeiture action, but also 
has required an ever lessening relationship between the "culpable act" 
and the forfeitable property. 
As a result of the expansion of civil forfeiture, property subject to 
seizure in forfeiture actions is increasingly part of the mainstream econ-
omy rather than contraband. However, no countervailing measures are 
being taken to mitigate the harsh effect this can have on innocent third 
parties such as creditors. To appreciate this impact, it is necessary to 
understand the mechanisms of civil forfeiture. The following sections 
discuss five fundamental elements of modern civil forfeiture: (1) the 
property subject to forfeiture and the doctrine of "traceable proceeds;" 
(2) the "relation back" doctrine; (3) the "innocent owner" defense; (4) 
the constitutional limitations on civil forfeiture; and (5) the post-forfei-
ture claims process and the petition for remission. 
1. Property Subject to Forfeiture and the Doctrine of "Traceable 
Proceeds" 
The American statutory forfeiture scheme is broader than the narrow 
Biblical "guilty property" doctrine. Both the 1970 Drug Control Act 
and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 contain provisions extending the 
notion of "guilty property" to include any property or chattel "tracea-
ble" to the crime.44 Courts have construed these provisions liberally to 
include property or funds that have "facilitated" illegal activity.4s Civil 
forfeiture law, therefore, has evolved from an approach of punishing 
"guilty property" to one of punishing those with a business association 
with a guilty individual.46 
In order to effectuate a forfeiture against particular assets, the govern-
42. 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1992). 
43. 18 U.S.C. § 984(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1992). 
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(I) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6). It 
should be noted that the original 1970 Drug Control Act only allowed for the forfeiture 
of either the drugs themselves or the means of their production and distribution. It was 
not until the 1978 amendments to the Act that "traceable proceeds" were also included. 
See 92 Buena Vzsta Ave. II, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1133 n.16 (1993); see also 18 U.S.C. § 984 
(applying forfeiture to money laundering and fungible property). 
45. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417, 
769 F. Supp. 80, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that "[e]ven if a portion of the property 
sought to be forfeited is used to 'facilitate' the alleged offense, then all of the property is 
forfeitable") (citations omitted); see also United States v. Daccarett, Nos. 1264, 1265, 92-
6229,92-6259, 1993 WL 347041, at "'17 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 1993) (holding that property 
need only have "nexus" not "substantial connection" to illegal activity to be subject to 
forfeiture). 
46. See Pratt & Petersen, supra note 12, at 670. 
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ment need not present direct evidence supporting its position that the 
forfeited property is traceable to the illegal activity.47 It only need 
demonstrate probable cause that such is the case.48 For example, in 
United States v. Parcels of Land, 49 the government asserted that certain 
properties had been purchased with the proceeds of illegal drug activities. 
The court allowed the forfeiture of the properties based upon evidence 
that the value of the properties greatly exceeded the purchasers' reported 
annual income, and that the properties were purchased with large sums 
of cash. 50 
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Banco 
Cafetero Panama 51 illustrates the government's attempt to forfeit prop-
erty beyond the direct proceeds of an illegal transaction. In Banco 
Cafetero, the government attempted to seize $3 million in five separate 
accounts belonging to a depositor, although these funds were not directly 
linked to a particular drug transaction. 52 The court permitted forfeiture 
not only against the depositor's accounts, but also against the depositee 
bank's own account at a second bank, into which the depositee bank 
transferred the depositor's forfeitable funds. 53 The court concluded that 
uncertainties as to the source of the particular funds are to be resolved in 
favor of the government. 54 Similarly, in United States v. Certain Funds 
on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417,55 a forfeiture of funds in a money 
laundering scheme was upheld where legitimate and illegal funds were 
commingled in the bank accounts of various corporations. 56 
Adding to the uncertainty and instability caused by the breadth of civil 
47. See, e.g., Daccarett, 1993 WL 347041, at *17 ("A finding of probable cause may 
be based on hearsay, even hearsay from confidential informants, or circumstantial evi-
dence .... ") (citations omitted); United States v. One 1987 Mercedes 560 SEL, 919 F.2d 
327, 331 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Probable cause can be established by circumstantial or hearsay 
evidence. "). 
48. See Daccarett, 1993 WL 347041, at *15-17. 
49. 903 F.2d 36, 39-40 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 916 (1990). 
50. See id. at 42. 
51. 797 F.2d 1154 (2d Cir. 1986). 
52. See id. at 1156, 1158. 
53. See id. at 1161. 
54. See id. The Second Circuit in Banco Cafetero held that in tracing the proceeds of 
illicit activity that are commingled in an account with legitimate funds, the government 
can use either of two methods at its option. First, the government can assume that the 
account contains the traceable proceeds as long as the account balance remains greater 
than the amount of the tainted deposit. Alternatively, the government can assume that 
any withdrawal greater than the amount of the tainted deposit contains the traceable 
proceeds. See id. at 1159-60. This holding left a loophole because the first method could 
be foreclosed by placing the funds into an account in which the balance would faIl below 
the amount of the tainted deposit. Congress subsequently enacted 18 U.S.C. § 984, which 
closed that loophole with respect to money laundering activities covered by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986. See United States v. All Funds Presently On Deposit Or At-
tempted To Be Deposited In Any Accounts Maintained At American Express Bank, No. 
CY-92-531O, 1993 WL 352099, at *14-16 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1993). 
55. 769 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
56. See id. at 84-85. Although this case did not specifically adopt the analysis used in 
Banco Cafetero, 797 F.2d 1154, it nevertheless upheld a forfeiture on the grounds that the 
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forfeiture laws is the government's stated position that it has absolute 
discretion to determine which assets should be subject to forfeiture. For 
example, in the recent Supreme Court decision 92 Buena Vista A ve. 11,57 
the government asserted that the "traceable proceeds" provision of the 
1970 Drug Control Act left to the government the determination as to 
which "proceeds" it could seize.58 Under the government's view, if a 
house is purchased with drug money and that house is sold to buy an-
other house, the government is allowed to seize both houses or, in order 
to mitigate the harshness of a forfeiture in certain circumstances, only 
one house at its discretion. 59 The Court declined to rule on the merits of 
that issue because it was beyond the subject of the grant of certiorari.6O 
Nonetheless, such unbridled discretion must be addressed in order to 
prevent the increasing use of civil forfeiture statutes from undermining 
the legitimate expectations of the financial community. 
2. "Relation Back" Doctrine 
Perhaps the most far-reaching aspect of both the 1970 Drug Control 
Act61 and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 198662 is the so-called "relation 
back" doctrine. Both statutes provide that "[a]l1 right, title, and interest 
in property ... shall vest in the United States upon commission of the act 
giving rise to forfeiture . .. ."63 However, the relation back doctrine has 
been applied even in the absence of statutory provisions. 
For example, in Western Pacific Fisheries, Inc. v. SS President Grant,M 
the court, in considering a damage claim arising from a collision at sea, 
considered the defendant's argument that evidence should have been ad-
mitted to show that the plaintiffs' ship was carrying illegal drugs at the 
time of the collision.65 Basing its argument upon the relation back doc-
trine, the defendant maintained that if the drug claim were substantiated, 
title to the plaintiffs' ship should have retroactively reverted to the gov-
ernment and, therefore, plaintiffs would not have standing to bring the 
present suit.66 The court, although rejecting defendant's argument be-
cause the government had not yet "consummated" its forfeiture, recog-
nized that had a forfeiture with formal proceedings occurred, "[t]here is 
clear authority that . . . the forfeiture relates back to the time of the 
funds "facilitated" the illegal activity. See Certain Funds On Deposit. 769 F. Supp. at 84-
85. 
57. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). 
58. See id. at 1138. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. 
61. 21 U.S.C. § 881. 
62. 18 U.S.C. § 981. 
63. 18 U.S.C. § 981(f) (1988) (emphasis added); 21 U.S.C. § 881(h) (1988) (emphasis 
added). 
64. 730 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1984). 
65. See id. at 1286. 
66. See id. 
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violation.,,67 Therefore, the broad reach of the relation back doctrine 
provides another potential for conflict between the government's ability 
to seize a criminal's property and the rights of non-culpable third parties. 
3. "Innocent Owner" Defense 
Although seemingly at odds with the relation back doctrine, Congress 
has statutorily protected certain non-culpable third parties by incorpo-
rating "innocent owner" provisions into the federal forfeiture statutes. 
For example, the 1970 Drug Control Act provides that "no property 
shall be forfeited ... to the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of 
any act or omission established by that owner to have been committed or 
omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner.,,68 
Numerous courts have examined who is an "owner" for purposes of 
the "innocent owner" defense.69 For example, courts have held that un-
secured creditors are not "owners" in this context. 70 Secured creditors, 
on the other hand, are deemed by statute to be owners.71 
The Supreme Court, in 92 Buena Vista Ave. 11,72 held that the inno-
cent owner provision in the 1970 Drug Control Act is not limited to bona 
fide purchasers and may include donees.73 This holding is premised 
upon the unqualified use in the statute of the word "owner" which "fore-
close[s] any contention that it applies only to bona fide purchasers.,,74 
Thus, the respondent who purchased the forfeited property with illegal 
proceeds received as a gift had standing to challenge the forfeiture. 75 
67. [d. at 1287. 
68. 21 U.S.c. § 881(a)(7). The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 also provides for the 
protection of nonculpable third parties, but adds "lienholder" to those protected. See 18 
U.S.C. § 981(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Note that neither statute, however, protects 
innocent unsecured creditors. 
69. See United States v. One 1987 Volkswagen Jetta, 760 F. Supp. 772, 775 (W.D. 
Mo. 1991) ("Broadly speaking, ownership may be defined as having a possessory interest 
in the res, with its attendant characteristics of dominion and control.") (quoting United 
States v. One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, Serial Number 22186,604 F.2d 27, 28 
(8th Cir. 1979) (citing United States v. Fifteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($15,500.00),558 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1977))); see also United States v. 6109 Grubb Rd., 
886 F.2d 618, 625 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989) ("The term 'owner' should be broadly interpreted to 
include any person with a recognizable legal or equitable interest in the property seized. ") 
(quoting 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522-23). But see United States v. Contents of Ac-
counts Nos. 3034504504 and 144-07143 at Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, 
Inc., 971 F.2d 974, 986-87 (3d Cir. 1992) (adopting "dominion and control" test, but 
declining to apply it to a straw owner), cerro denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993). 
70. See United States v. One 1987 Cadillac Deville, 774 F. Supp. 221, 224 (D. Del. 
1991). It is interesting to note that the court in United States V. Mageean, 649 F. Supp. 
820 (D. Nev. 1986), aff'd, 822 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1987), in the context ofa criminal RICO 
statute, held that unsecured trade creditors were considered "bona fide purchasers" for 
purposes of an innocent owner defense. See id. at 829. 
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 98 I (a)(2). 
72. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). 
73. See id. at 1134-36. 
74. [d. at 1134. 
75. See id. 
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The dissent in 92 Buena Vista Ave. II asserted that a donee who re-
ceives property in a transfer without value has no greater rights in a for-
feiture action than the donor.76 This conclusion is necessary, the dissent 
argued, to prevent the cleansing of tainted proceeds by transferring the 
proceeds to relatives or other third parties.77 The dissent concluded that 
to hold otherwise "rips out the most effective enforcement provisions in 
all of the drug forfeiture laws. "78 
The level of "innocence" required for an owner to invoke the "inno-
cent owner" defense also is somewhat unclear. The 1970 Drug Control 
Act speaks of an owner "without the knowledge or consent,,79 while the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 omits the words "or consent" and simply 
states "without the knowledge.,,8o The Second Circuit, in United States 
v. One Tintoretto Painting,81 recognized two innocent owner defenses to a 
civil forfeiture action that the Supreme Court previously addressed in 
dictum in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing CO. 82 These two de-
fenses are: (1) the object was stolen or taken without the innocent 
owner's consent, and (2) the innocent owner did all that could reasonably 
be expected to prevent the proscribed use of the property.83 A district 
court recently held that the innocent owner defenses under the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1986 lessened the burden imposed by Calero-Toledo 
and "requires only a showing of ignorance of the illegal transactions.,,84 
One issue that the Supreme Court appears to have resolved is whether 
the relation back doctrine "trumps" the innocent owner provisions in-
cluded in the federal civil forfeiture statutes. In 92 Buena Vista Ave. I,8s 
the Third Circuit had held that the "relation back" doctrine did not 
trump the "innocent owner" defense.86 In Eggleston v. Colorado,87 the 
Tenth Circuit had reached a contrary result, holding that the innocent 
76. See id. at 1143-46 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
77. See id. at 1145. 
78. Id. at 1146. 
79. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). 
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2). 
81. 691 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1982). 
82. 416 U.S. 663, 689 (1974). 
83. See One Tintoretto Painting, 691 F.2d at 607 (citing Colero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 
689). 
84. United States v. 316 Units of Mun. Sees., 725 F. Supp. 172, 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
However, an owner that remains "wilfully blind" cannot claim the benefits of the inno-
cent owner defense. See United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera, 748 F. Supp. 1180, 1185 
(W.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, 946 F.2d 30 (5th Cir. 1991). 
85. 937 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1991), aff'd, 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). 
86. See id. at 102 ("[T]he relation back doctrine would only be relevant in this case if 
a determination were made that [the innocent owner] did not take out a valid innocent 
owner defense."). The Third Circuit relied, in part, on Judge Murnaghan's concurrence 
in In re One 1985 Nissan 300ZX, 889 F.2d 1317, 1322 (4th Cir. 1989). See 92 Buena 
Vista Ave. I, 937 F.2d at 102-03. One 1985 Nissan questioned that if the innocent owner 
defense were applicable only if the property was obtained prior to the illegal act, then 
"[b]ow can one obtain drug deal proceeds before the transaction even takes place?" One 
1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d at 1322. 
87. 873 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1989), cerL denied, 490 U.S. 1070 (1990). 
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owner defense is only applicable if the "owner" acquired the property 
prior to the commission of the illegal act. 88 Therefore, the government's 
seizure of property purchased by an innocent buyer after the occurrence 
of illicit activity would have been upheld in the Tenth Circuit, but not in 
the Third Circuit. 
The Supreme Court's decision in 92 Buena Vista Ave. II89 addressed 
this conflict by holding that for the innocent owner provisions to have 
meaning they must trump the relation back doctrine.9o The plurality as-
serted that the innocent owner defense would be meaningless if it only 
applied to cases where the ownership arose before the illegal activity.91 
The concurring opinions reasoned on semantic grounds that the govern-
ment could not forfeit property that it now owned retroactively because 
it could not forfeit its own property.92 
4. Constitutional Limitations 
Several recent Supreme Court cases have placed constitutionallimita-
tions on the government's use of forfeiture. In United States v. Halper,93 
the Supreme Court held that civil penalty and forfeiture actions, follow-
ing a criminal conviction, may be severe enough to constitute a second 
criminal punishment.94 In Halper, the government instituted a civil ac-
tion against the respondent following his federal conviction for submit-
ting sixty-five false Medicare c1aims.9s The government sought more 
than $130,000 in "remedial penalties" under the False Claims Act,96 
even though the respondent defrauded the government of only $585.97 
The Supreme Court stated that while most civil penalty suits were reme-
dial, these penalties could rise to the level of punishments if the sanctions 
were severe enough.98 The Court held that these civil sanctions consti-
tuted punishments when "the civil penalt[ies] ... b[ore] no rational rela-
tion to the goal of compensating the Government for its loss . . . ."99 
Consequently, the Court held that the government's second action was 
barred under the Double Jeopardy ClauselOo because "under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already has been punished in a crimi-
nal prosecution may not be subjected to an additional civil sanction to 
88. See id. at 248. 
89. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). 
90. See id. at 1137. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. at 1139-41. 
93. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
94. See id. at 446-49. 
95. See id. at 437. Halper had previously been found guilty of overbilling the govern-
ment for $585. Following his conviction, Halper was sentenced to two years of imprison-
ment and fined $5,000. See id. 
96. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
97. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 438-39. 
98. See id. at 448-49. 
99. [d. at 449. 
100. See id. at 452. 
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the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be characterized as 
remedial, but only as [punitive]."lOl 
In Austin v. United States,102 the Supreme Court held that civil forfei-
ture actions also implicate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against 
excessive fines.103 In Austin, the federal government instituted an in rem 
civil forfeiture action, pursuant to the 1970 Drug Control Act,l04 against 
the respondent's property following his guilty plea to a state drug posses-
sion charge. lOS The federal government sought the forfeiture of both the 
respondent's auto body shop, where the drug sale took place, and the 
respondent's home, where the cocaine was stored prior to sale. 106 Austin 
argued that this forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against excessive fines.107 Stating that the Eighth Amendment was in-
tended "to limit the government's power to punish," 108 the Court held 
that this protection extended to both civil and criminal actions. I09 Rely-
ing on Halper, the Court held that when a civil forfeiture ceases to be 
remedial and serves punitive goals, at least in part, then the forfeiture "is 
subject to the limitations of the [Eighth Amendment'S] Excessive Fines 
Clause."llo The Court remanded the case to the Eighth Circuit to de-
velop factors to consider when determining whether a forfeiture is 
"excessive."IlI 
5. Post-Forfeiture Claims Process and the Petition for Remission 
Current civil forfeiture law presents a two-tiered approach to resolving 
the claims of third parties affected by the forfeiture. First, parties who 
are "innocent owners" of seized property may file a proof of claim with 
101. Id. at 448-49. The Court remanded the case to the district court to determine 
what portion of the civil suit was remedial-and allowable-and what portion was puni-
tive and barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 452. 
102. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). 
103. See id. at 2812. 
104. 21 U.S.C. § 881. 
105. See Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2803. Austin had previously pled "guilty to one count of 
possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and was sentenced ... to seven years' impris-
onment." Id. 
106. See id. 
107. See id. 
108. Id. at 2805. 
109. See id. at 2806. 
110. Id. 
111. See id. at 2812. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion, advocated a different 
Eighth Amendment analysis for in rem forfeitures than for in personam fines. In his 
view, the "excessiveness" of an in personam penalty is determined by weighing the "value 
of the fine in relation to the offense." Id. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring). However, for in 
rem forfeitures, "[t]he relevant inquiry . . . is the relationship of the property to the 
offense." Id. In short, Justice Scalia's test for determining whether an in rem forfeiture is 
excessive under the Eighth Amendment is whether the property is an "instrumentality of 
the offense" or whether it is merely tangentially related to the crime. See id. As an 
example, Justice Scalia noted that scales used in unlawful drug sales are forfeitable 
"whether made of the purest gold or the basest metal... Id. 
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the district court. 112 In determining the validity of such a claim, the 
district court, usually through appointment of a Special Trustee, consid-
ers the proof of claim in light of common law and statutory provisions of 
forfeiture. 
Second, to the extent the parties seeking redress are not innocent own-
ers of seized property, there is no cognizable legal claim against the 
seized assets. Instead, the parties only may seek an equitable remedy 
from the DOl in the form of a petition for remission or mitigation over 
which the government has complete discretion. 113 Therefore, third par-
ties who are not innocent owners are left without recourse if they are 
dissatisfied with the DOl's determination on the petition. While a court 
may compel the Attorney General to consider the merits of a petition if it 
determines that the Attorney General has ignored the request, 114 judicial 
review may not be had on the merits. 115 This, however, places almost 
unchecked authority in the hands of the DOl, the same government 
agency that stands to benefit monetarily if the petition is denied. These 
provisions have generated both controversy and uncertainty. 
An example of the difficulty a party faces in contesting the denial of its 
petition for remission or mitigation is illustrated by LaChance v. Dnlg 
Enforcement Administration. 116 The Drug Enforcement Administration 
("the DEA") had seized $49,000 in cash belonging to LaChance, a pro-
fessional harness racer. 117 LaChance had attempted to carry the funds 
on a plane from New York's LaGuardia Airport to Montreal, but was 
forced to leave the funds in New York after being informed at a routine 
metal detector search of his luggage that such funds could not be taken 
abroad. After leaving the funds in the trunk of a borrowed car, 
LaChance was approached by DEA agents who wanted to know where 
he had left the money. LaChance took the agents to the car, and the 
agents gave LaChance a receipt for the funds, now in a brown bag. 118 
DEA drug-sniffing dogs detected the presence of narcotics either on the 
bag or the money. LaChance insisted that the funds were the proceeds 
from a horse sale and legal gambling activities and chose to challenge the 
forfeiture by a petition for remission rather than in court. 1 19 The DEA 
112. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (providing that the Sup-
plemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims shall govern the seizure of 
assets for forfeiture). 
113. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (adopting procedures pro-
vided in customs laws (19 U.S.C. § 1618 (1988»); 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1988) (same). The 
procedures for filing a petition for remission are set forth in 28 C.F.R. §§ 9.1-.7 (1992). 
114. See, e.g., In re Sixty Seven Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Dollars, 901 F.2d 
1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that a district court may have jurisdiction "when 
the agency does not even consider a request that it exercise its discretion"). 
115. See United States v. A Parcel of Land in the City of Lucedale, 791 F. Supp. 1144, 
1149 (S.D. Miss. 1991). 
116. 672 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
117. See id. at 77. 
118. See id. 
119. See id. at 78. 
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denied his petition on the grounds that there was conflicting evidence 
concerning his claim that the funds stemmed solely from legal activity. 120 
The court declined to review the denial of the petition, holding that a 
petition for remission is purely administrative. 121 The court also held 
that an agency's refusal to grant the petition may only be reversed where 
the agency refuses to consider the petition or maintains a "formalized 
invariable policy of denying petitions and, in fact, fails to give any reason 
for denial of the petition in question."I22 
II. THE McNAMARA CASE-AN EXAMPLE OF CIVIL FORFEITURE 
GONE AWRY 
This Part explores the tension between forfeiture law and commercial 
and bankruptcy law by examining the effect of the John McNamara for-
feiture l23 action on creditors. In 1992, the federal government accused 
John McNamara of defrauding General Motors Acceptance Corporation 
("GMAC") of more than $400 million.124 The ensuing civil forfeiture l25 
included a Cessna jet, a car dealership, shopping centers, real estate hold-
ings, a gold mine, and other properties owned by McNamara or arguably 
traceable to his allegedly illegal activities. 126 Excluded from the forfei-
ture were a $500,000 private trust and a $350,000 house owned by 
McNamara's estranged wife. 127 
In the years prior to the forfeiture, a significant number of financial 
institutions had extended loans to McNamara and his various corporate 
entities without any knowledge of or reason to suspect McNamara's ille-
gal activities. Today, following the forfeiture of McNamara's assets, 
these financial institutions are confronted with unpaid loans and a debtor 
whose assets have been seized by the government. 
120. Although the DOJ generally reviews petitions for remission, under certain limited 
instances of administrative forfeiture, as in LaChance, the authority is granted to the 
DEA. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 1316.77·.81 (1993). 
121. See LaChance, 672 F. Supp. at 79. 
122. Id. at 80 (citing United States v. One 1970 Buick Riviera, 463 F.2d 1168 (5th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 980 (1972». 
123. United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, No. CY-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 
1992). 
124. See Jane Fritsch, Prosecutors Depict Vast Fraud Scheme By LI. Car Dealer, N.Y. 
Times, Apr. 16, 1992, at AI. 
It should be noted that various estimates of the fraud were reported. Some news re-
ports placed the fraud at $436 million. See id. at B4. Other reports placed the fraud at 
$422 million. See John T. McQuiston, Assets of Auto Dealer in Fraud Case to Be Sold, 
N.Y. Times, Aug. 31, 1992, at B2. GMAC itself, in its claim filed against McNamara, 
estimated the amount at $444 million. See Jeanne Dugan Cooper, La ..... suit Links GMAC 
to McNamara Fraud, Newsday, Oct. 27, 1992, at 22. 
125. See McNamara, No. CY-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992). 
126. See Fritsch, supra note 124, at AI. 
127. See Lueck, supra note 3, at B1. 
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A. United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac 128 
Described by Andrew Maloney, United States Attorney for the East-
ern District of New York, as "the mother of all kiting schemes,,,129 
McNamara's fraud lasted for over seven years. From January 1985 until 
December 1991, McNamara borrowed more than $6 billion from 
GMAC allegedly to finance car purchases for his Long Island car dealer-
ship, McNamara Buick-Pontiac. Under the scheme, McNamara in-
formed GMAC that the borrowed funds would be used to purchase 
refurbished cars and vans from an Indiana corporation, Kay Industries. 
These cars and vans, in tum, would be shipped to Cydonia Trading Ltd. 
in Cyprus. In reality, both entities were "shell companies" linked to 
McNamara. The loans were used to finance McNamara's personal hold-
ings including real estate, a gold mine, and other personal assets. McNa-
mara never missed a loan payment, and would simply borrow from 
GMAC to payoff existing loans. It was not until 1991 that GMAC's 
auditors became suspicious of McNamara's claim that he needed $2.1 
billion to purchase 70,000 vehicles. Further inquiry revealed that the 
vehicle identification numbers did not appear in automotive trade jour-
nals. Subsequent investigation confirmed the GMAC auditors' suspi-
cions that the vehicles were indeed shams, created on paper to perpetuate 
the McNamara loan-kiting scheme. 130 
In addition to the forfeiture action, McNamara was indicted on one 
RICO count and six federal wire fraud counts. 131 In the aggregate, these 
charges carried a maximum sentence of 20 years and more than $800 
million in fines. \32 McNamara, who originally pleaded not guilty, was 
released on a bond of $300 million, most of which was forfeited prop-
erty.133 He eventually pleaded guilty to the racketeering charge in a plea 
bargain agreement with the government. 134 
The government maintained that the civil forfeiture action would en-
able McNamara to devote his remaining resources to defending the crim-
inal charges, \35 by freezing the claims of GMAC and nearly 6,000 other 
creditors,136 including the numerous financial institutions that had se-
cured and/or unsecured claims against the McNamara entities. 137 The 
128. No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992). 
129. Fritsch, supra note 124, at B4. "Kiting" is a slang term that refers to a debtor's 
continuing practice of borrowing money from one source to repay another source of debt. 
See id. 
130. For an overview of the fraud, see id. 
131. See Jacques Steinberg, Auto Dealer is Indicted for Fraud, N.Y. Times, May 27, 
1992, at B4. 
132. See id. 
133. See Steven Lee Myers, L.1. Dealer Pleads Not Guilty to G.M Loan Fraud Charges, 
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1992, at B5. 
134. See Fredrick M. Winship, UPI, Sept. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, 
UPI File. 
135. See Lueck, supra note 3, at B1. 
136. See McQuiston, supra note 124. 
137. One of the major problems for McNamara's creditors is that the forfeiture order 
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government contended that "[i]t is not the policy of the Government to 
take over properties from innocent parties."138 The government's inten-
tion was to use civil forfeiture in "a novel, imaginative and just way to 
insure that the public is protected." 139 In actuality, however, the govern-
ment has used forfeiture law to supplant bankruptcy law by liquidating 
the McNamara estate and resolving claims of creditors. As this Article 
shows, forfeiture law never was intended for that broad purpose. 
B. Civil Forfeiture's Usurpation of Commercial and Bankruptcy Law 
Principles 
In order to understand how civil forfeiture actions affect creditors, it is 
first necessary to understand the process by which creditors, such as fi-
nancial institutions, extend credit. In making lending decisions and in 
determining interest rates and other lending terms, financial institutions 
consider factors such as the borrower's financial condition, management, 
and the likelihood of both default and potential recovery of principal and 
interest on defaulted loans. In assessing the default risk, financial institu-
tions also consider their rights and remedies under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code and the Bankruptcy Code and the likelihood of recoveries. 
Notably absent from this "checklist" is the risk of civil forfeiture of the 
borrower's assets. It is, of course, impossible at the time of the credit 
decision to estimate the likelihood of civil forfeiture because the underly-
ing illicit action that may give rise to the forfeiture is as yet undiscovered, 
and also because the bringing of such an action is politically determined. 
Furthermore, even if the financial institution were to assume the worst-
that each borrower's assets would be subject to civil forfeiture-it is im-
possible to estimate how claims will be paid, if at all. 
Note that even small scale forfeitures can affect creditors. For exam-
ple, a local grocer may extend credit to a neighborhood resident who 
turns out to be a drug dealer. If the government seizes not only the con-
traband, but all of the resident's assets, the grocer is left unpaid. One 
may question whether there is a difference, other than of scale, between 
forfeiture in this situation and forfeiture in the McNamara case. None-
theless, the government's interest in seizing the assets of the drug dealer, 
whose victim is really society at large, perhaps may be said to outweigh 
the occasional and incidental injustice. 14O On the other hand, when the 
imposes a stay on all pending actions (including foreclosure proceedings) and requires 
that state court-appointed receivers turn over all proceeds from the forfeited assets to the 
Special Trustee appointed in the federal forfeiture action. See United States v. McNa-
mara Buick Pontiac, No. CV-92-2070 1111 4-5 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992). See infra note 
204 for further discussion of the implications of federal stay of state court proceedings. 
138. Jane Fritsch, U.S. to Seek Forfeiture, N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1992, at B4. 
139. Martin Fox, $400 Million Civil Forfeiture Ordered in Long Island Auto Loan Pros-
ecution, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1992, at I, 5. 
140. The government would also argue that the grocer could file a petition for remis-
sion. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, the grocer is an innocent 
trade creditor of the drug dealer, and therefore would have been entitled, under non-
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assets seized are a significant part of the mainstream economy, and par-
ticularly when the illicit activity is fraud directed toward private parties, 
the balance more obviously shifts so that the interests of creditors out-
weigh the government's incidental interest in seizing the assets. 
The concerns in either case at least could be mitigated if the seizure 
were only of those assets directly used in the illicit activity. The conflict 
with innocent third parties therefore results, to some extent, from the 
zealousness of prosecutors in seizing traceable proceeds141 in addition to 
assets used in the illicit activity. 
This conflict is exemplified by six problems that are raised by the appli-
cation of civil forfeiture in the commercial context: (1) the lack of a well-
defined statutory procedure; (2) the failure to recognize unsecured 
claims; (3) the failure to respect separate corporate entities; (4) the un-
dermining of the Bankruptcy Code policy of discouraging setoffs; (5) the 
obstruction of state law remedies; and (6) the problems caused by the 
preemption of bankruptcy avoiding powers. 
1. Forfeiture Lacks a Well-Defined Statutory Procedure 
In a civil forfeiture action, an unsecured creditor has virtually no pro-
cedural mechanisms through which to become informed and contest 
matters affecting its interests. Because civil forfeiture is a remedy that 
derives from antiquated admiralty seizures, 142 the creditor lacks the well-
established procedures necessary for application in a complex and mod-
ern commercial world. In addition, current civil forfeiture law does not 
present a forum where creditors or their representatives are encouraged 
to participate or be heard. 143 
In comparison, under federal bankruptcy law, all creditors are notified 
and invited to attend an initial meeting of creditors and, in the case of 
reorganization proceedings, to participate in subsequent periodic hear-
ings.l44 Committees of creditors, and where appropriate committees of 
holders of equity securities, are required or permitted by law to be ap-
pointed to represent the parties in interest generally and to participate in 
the case. 145 Debtor company actions that are outside the ordinary course 
forfeiture law, to assert a claim as of right against the drug dealer's assets. The forfeiture 
takes away this right. 
141. See supra part I.B.1. 
142. See supra note 25. 
143. Although the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims 
provide for limited notice and hearing requirements, both the procedural and substantive 
provisions regUlating bankruptcy court proceedings appear to be lacking in forfeiture law. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 981 (1988); 28 U.S.C.A. Supp. Rules for Certain Admiralty and Mari-
time Claims, B(2), C(4). 
144. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 342, 1109(b) (1988). 
145. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 705, 1102 (1988). Committees of creditors are required under 
federal bankruptcy law in chapter 11 reorganizations and permitted at the request of 
creditors in chapter 7 liquidations. See 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(I) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 705 (a) 
(1988). Although a forfeiture action could be in the nature of either a reorganization or a 
liquidation, the McNamara forfeiture is in the nature of a liquidation. In a chapter 7 
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of business require court authorization after notice is given to creditors 
and other interested parties, and after a hearing is held at which a bank-
ruptcy judge can consider all parties' views. l46 Furthermore, in the reor-
ganization of a debtor company, the final resolution of claims and 
interests normally is negotiated as part of a consensual plan, and is ap-
proved through a voting procedure that is carefully balanced to protect 
the rights of all parties.147 In short, the Bankruptcy Code is designed to 
allow a debtor either to reorganize its affairs or to liquidate, while simul-
taneously allowing creditors to participate in events that could materially 
affect the debtor or the debtor's obligations. 
In a civil forfeiture, on the other hand, there is no meaningful proce-
dure for creditors. Creditors are notified, at best, intermittently.148 In 
addition, individual creditors rarely have an economic stake large enough 
to actively participate in the forfeiture proceeding. Therefore, they are 
effectively disenfranchised and are unable to formally participate in the 
proceeding or to be represented by a committee of representative credi-
tors. 149 Indeed, even for creditors having a large stake, there is no forum 
in which issues and concerns are discussed on a current basis. 
2. Forfeiture Fails to Give Formal Recognition to Unsecured Claims 
Civil forfeiture does not recognize unsecured creditors as having 
claims as of right. ISO Except to the extent that a creditor may have a 
liquidation, a trustee is appointed to "collect and reduce to money the property of the 
estate ... as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of panies in interest." 
11 U.S.C. § 704(1) (1988). The committee of creditors is authorized to consult with the 
trustee or court appointed administrative officers in connection with the administration of 
the estate, make recommendations respecting performance of the trustee's duties, and 
submit to the court or its administrative officers questions affecting the administration of 
the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 705. 
146. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988). Certain administrative and procedural issues 
are heard before a trustee who is part of the court system, as opposed to a judge. See 11 
U.S.C. Part X-lOOl to X-101O (1988). 
147. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123-1129 (1988). For an introduction to bankruptcy, see 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Basics of Business Reorganization in Bankruptcy, 68 J. Com. Bank 
Lending 36 (1985), revised and updated in A Special Collection From the J. Com. Bank 
Lending: Bankruptcy 79 (1988). 
148. Title 18 of the United States Code, section 981, has no ongoing notice 
requirements. 
149. It is conceivable that creditors in a forfeiture action could join forces, but no 
provision for such committees exists in law or in practice. In fact, the discretionary na-
ture of forfeitures may discourage the formation of such committees, as parties may wish 
to gain favor with the government on an individual basis. Furthermore, such committees 
would have no legal foundation or norms upon which to premise any plan for distribu-
tion, and individual creditors would be unsure of whether the plan would give them bet-
ter status than a court. 
150. The failure of civil forfeiture law to recognize unsecured claims as of right may 
well result from the fact that, until recently, only specific assets were seized by the gov-
ernment. Where, on the other hand, the government seizes all of a company's assets, all 
parties with "interests" in the company are affected-whether those interests stem from 
ownership, collateral, or merely an unsecured claim. Unsecured claims can arise, for 
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security interest in collateral, lSI the creditor does not have a legally rec-
ognized claim. Creditors, to the extent of their unsecured claims, there-
fore are unable to avail themselves of the "innocent owner" defense,ls2 
and are limited to filing petitions for remission, subject to the DOJ's 
whim.ls3 
The Attorney General's discretion and a line of forfeiture cases hold-
ing that the government's decision as to how to allocate forfeited assets 
to creditors, if at all, is not subject to judicial review on the merits,IS4 
create a "chilling effect" on creditors. Why, for example, should a credi-
tor attempt to challenge a government action in a forfeiture case if the 
creditor has no leverage over the government and the possible result of 
the challenge is to antagonize the same government officials who will 
have absolute discretion in deciding how or whether to reimburse the 
creditor's claim? 
Furthermore, because there is no requirement that creditors who are 
similarly situated be equally reimbursed from the forfeited assets, the 
possibility exists that these creditors will be treated inconsistently. This 
is contrary to bankruptcy law, which generally requires parity of treat-
ment for creditors having similar claims. ISS 
Similarly, in bankruptcy, the claims of unsecured creditors are supe-
rior to any governmental claims for "forfeiture ... or punitive damages 
... to the extent that such [a] ... forfeiture [is] not compensation for [an] 
actual pecuniary loss .... "IS6 While civil forfeitures are usually reme-
dial in nature,IS7 the Supreme Court has held that where a "civil penalty 
. . . bears no rational relation to the goal of compensating the Govern-
ment for its loss" it is punitive. ls8 
example, from loans made to the company or for payment of the purchase price of goods 
or services rendered to the company. 
151. Title 18, section 981(a)(2), of the United States Code by its own terms recognizes 
a "lien" on collateral of an innocent creditor. Even that may be subject to negotiation. A 
valuation of collateral is subjective, and a low valuation can result in the creditor being 
unsecured to the extent the amount of the claim exceeds the collateral valuation. Fur-
thermore, secured creditors, even though the Supreme Court in 92 Buena Vista Ave. II 
explicitly rejected the government's relation back argument, must still establish the "in-
nocent owner" defense prior to being granted their legal claim. See 92 Buena Vista Ave. 
II, 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1134 (1993). 
152. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2); United States v. One 1987 Cadillac Deville, 774 F. 
Supp. 221, 224 (D. Del. 1991). 
153. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)-(e) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Compare § 726 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code which creates an unambiguous ordering of priorities of claims and §§ 501 
and 502 of the Bankruptcy Code which give legal recognition to unsecured claims. See 
11 U.S.C. §§ 501, 502, 726 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
154. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1988). 
156. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4) (1988). 
157. See, e.g., United States v. 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d 41, 43-44 (1st Cir. 1989) 
(holding that the government's seizure of appellant's seventeen acre marijuana farm was 
remedial); United States v. 30 Ironwood Ct., 776 F. Supp. 1242, 1245 (N.D. 1lI. 1991) 
(holding that forfeiture of plaintiff's property for a drug offense was remedial). 
158. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449 (1989); see supra part I.BA. 
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In McNamara, the government sought the forfeiture of over $400 mil-
lion of property. McNamara's kiting scheme-although injuring private 
third party creditors-was not a theft of government money. Conse-
quently, the government's "losses," at most, consisted of its "costs" of 
investigating and legally pursuing McNamara. ls9 Coincidentally, the 
salaries of all the United States Attorneys and their Assistants in 1989 
totalled only $434 million. 16O Unless the federal government's entire 
legal staff surrendered all their other responsibilities in order to pursue 
McNamara, the $400 million forfeiture appears to go well beyond 
remediation and bears "no rational relation"161 to the government's loss. 
Consequently, under the Bankruptcy Code, the government's forfeiture 
claims against McNamara-as punitive claims- would be subordinate 
to the claims of unsecured creditors. 162 
It also should be noted that courts' construction of the forfeiture laws 
as not recognizing unsecured claims as of right makes for poor public 
policy in the commercial context. For example, in United States v. One 
1987 Cadillac DeVille,163 the government and an innocent third party 
claimant disputed the priority of their respective interests in an automo-
bile, the purchase of which constituted "money laundering" of illegal 
drug profits. l64 The claimant asserted that he had loaned his cousin the 
money to buy the vehicle, and that the car was collateral for the loan. 
The claimant, however, failed to perfect his security interest in the auto-
mobile under state law.165 Accordingly, the court ruled that "[a]gainst 
the Government, the claimant stands in the position of an unsecured 
159. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 445. The injury to the government also "include[s] ... 
[the] ancillary costs, such as the costs of detection and investigation. that routinely attend 
the government's efforts .... " Id.; see also United States v. 38 Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d 
29, 37 (2d Cir.) (holding that compensation includes not only remedying the govern-
ment's direct pecuniary loss but also its investigatory, overhead. and other costs attribu-
table to the matter), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 55 (1992). 
160. See Office of Management and Budget. Budget of the United States GOI'ernment: 
Fiscal Year 1991, at A-224 (1990). 
161. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 449. 
162. See 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988). These facts also raise an issue of whether forfeitures 
such as the McNamara forfeiture constitute "excessive" fines under the Eighth Amend-
ment. In Austin v. United States. 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993). the majority emphasized that 
while the Court has used the "guilty property" fiction to justify forfeiture actions in the 
past, there was always an element of "culpability" present in these actions. See id. at 
2809. The Court interpreted Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co .• 416 U.S. 663 
(1974) as holding "that forfeiture of a truly innocent owner's property [which arguably 
should include a claim of an innocent unsecured creditor] would raise 'serious constitu-
tional questions.''' Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2809 (quoting Calero-Toledo. 416 U.S. at 689-
90). 
In addition, by focusing solely on the acts of the culpable debtor, Justice Scalia's ap-
proach in Austin of limiting forfeiture to the "instrumentality of the offense" would limit 
application of the traceable proceeds doctrine and preserve more assets for the benefit of 
unsecured creditors. See id. at 2815 (Scalia, J .• concurring). 
163. 774 F. Supp. 221 (D. De\. 1991). 
164. See id. at 222. 
165. See id. at 223. 
308 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
creditor." 166 
In addition to noting that an unsecured creditor lacks standing to chal-
lenge a federal forfeiture action,167 the court stated that the government, 
in a federal forfeiture action, effectively has the status of a lien creditor 
under Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C.") section 9_301(3).168 Con-
sequently, under U.C.C. section 9-301(1)(b), the claimant's unperfected 
security interest was subordinate to the government's "lien creditor" 
interest. 169 
Although 1987 Cadillac DeVille pertained to an informal family lend-
ing arrangement, the court's rationale as to why an unsecured creditor's 
claim should be subordinate to the government's interest in seized prop-
erty is revealing. The court concluded that "[i]f the claimant does indeed 
have a valid agreement with his cousin, the owner of the car, for repay-
ment of a loan, he may seek redress from her.,,170 This logic presup-
poses, however, that the cousin had assets remaining against which the 
claimant could attempt to recover. 
Where, however, the government by using the relation back and trace-
able proceeds doctrines is able to seize all assets of a corporate borrower, 
there may be no assets remaining from which creditors can be repaid. 
The logical flaw in the 1987 Cadillac DeVille court's analysis is that it 
assumes there are assets-other than those seized by the government-
against which an innocent unsecured creditor can seek to be repaid.!7! 
Forfeiture law also creates an anomaly in that a donee who does not 
give value may be protected under the innocent owner provisions. In 
contrast, the only recourse of an unsecured creditor who does give value 
is to file a discretionary petition for remission. 172 In 92 Buena Vista Ave. 
II,173 the Supreme Court held that bona fide purchasers who acquire 
property after the "culpable act" of the prior owner are permitted to 
retain the property free of any governmental forfeiture claims relating 
back to the culpable act. 174 Similar results are reached under commer-
cial law, which allows bona fide purchasers who give value to acquire 
166. See id. at 224. 
167. See id. (citing United States v. One 1965 Cessna 320C Twin Engine Airplane, 715 
F. Supp. 808 (E.D. Ky. 1989)). 
168. See id. 
169. See id. 
170. /d. 
171. See supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right of a 
bona fide purchaser to defeat the government's claim to a seized asset. If the bona fide 
purchaser were subordinate to the government's claim, the purchaser would have inno-
cently paid value and, in effect, received nothing in return. But this is the same situation 
as that of an innocent creditor who, after advancing money or goods to a company, ceases 
to have a debtor responsible for repayment because the government seized all of the 
debtor's assets. 
172. See supra note 113. 
173. 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993). 
174. See id. at 1134-37. 
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goods free of pre-existing security interests. 17S 
92 Buena Vista Ave. II went further, however, by extending the inno-
cent owner defense to the recipients of gifts even though existing case law 
fails to extend the defense to unsecured creditors. 176 This creates the 
inequity that donees who have not given value are protected, while un-
secured creditors who have given value are not. This is particularly 
troublesome because commercial law traditionally disfavors not-for-
value exchanges but protects for-value exchanges. 177 The solution would 
be to extend the innocent owner defense to unsecured creditors who give 
value. 
3. Forfeiture Does Not Respect Separate Corporate Identities 
"[T]he real purpose [behind] much [of] commerciallaw"178 is the busi-
ness world's reliance on reasonable contractual expectations. Preserving 
reasonable expectations also has been recognized as essential in both 
bankruptcy cases and cases involving interpretation of contracts. For ex-
ample, in In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 179 the Second Circuit refused 
to substantively consolidatel80 two separate but related bankruptcy debt-
175. See U.C.C. § 9-307. For example, U.C.C. § 9-307(1) provides that a "buyer in 
ordinary course of business" (a person who buys out of the seller's "inventory") takes free 
of pre-existing perfected security interests in those goods. Section 1-201(9) of the U.C.C. 
defines a "buyer in ordinary course of business" as one who "buys" by giving cash, prop-
erty, or other forms of new value. Similarly, § 9-307(2) protects casual buyers of con-
sumer goods (the "garage sale" purchaser) from pre-existing security interests. Most 
casual purchasers take free of pre-existing perfected security interests in these goods if, 
inter alia, the casual bona fide purchasers gives new value. Moreover, § 2-403(1) of the 
U.C.C. also protects bona fide purchasers of goods from a seller \vith voidable title. This 
section allows, in certain circumstances, the seller to convey better title than he actually 
owns to a buyer who gives value. For example, if A entrusts his watch to jeweler B for 
repairs, and B sells A's watch in the ordinary course of business to C for value, then C 
acquires title to A's watch. See James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commer-
cial Code, § 3-11 (3d ed. 1988). 
176. See 92 Buena VlSta Ave. II, 113 S. Ct. at 1134. 
177. The U.C.C. generally allows bona fide purchasers who "give value" to acquire 
goods free of a third party's perfected security interest, or even a third party's bona fide 
claim to title in the goods. See supra note 175. Similarly, the Bankruptcy Code also 
favors "for value" transactions over gift conveyances or "unequal exchanges." See 11 
U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A) (1988) (allowing the trustee in certain circumstances to set aside 
conveyances if the debtor's estate did not receive "reasonably equivalent value" in 
return). 
178. G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Stalldards for Commoll LAw Rules ill Com-
mercial Cases: An Emerging Statutory Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1198, 1203 (1988); see 
also U.C.C. § 1-205 (emphasizing the importance of course of dealing and the usage of 
trade); U.C.C. § 2-609 (discussing the right to adequate assurance of performance in 
commercial transactions). 
179. 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988). 
180. In certain instances, a bankruptcy court may use its equitable powers under § 105 
of the Bankruptcy Code to substantively consolidate two or more affiliated corporations. 
See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). This means that the court will order that the assets and 
liabilities of separate corporations be treated as if such corporations were merged. In 
determining whether to substantively consolidate the estates of mUltiple debtors, bank-
ruptcy courts look to a number of factors, including: 
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ors' estates, a process which would have combined the debtors' assets to 
form a single pool from which all creditors would share ratably. Had the 
court allowed substantive consolidation in Augie/Restivo, the lender to 
the more solvent of the two debtors would have received less of a recov-
ery from the pooled assets than it would have obtained by looking exclu-
sively to the assets of its more solvent debtor. The court held that 
allowing substantive consolidation would run counter to the lenders' ex-
pectations that "are central to the calculation of interest rates and other 
types of loans, and fulfilling those expectations is therefore important to 
the efficiency of credit markets.,,181 
Civil forfeiture law, as presently codified, can wreak havoc upon the 
reasonable expectations of creditors. 182 This premise is best understood 
within the context of the McNamara Buick-Pontiac forfeiture by consid-
ering a fictitious but representative creditor, "Island Bank." Assume 
that some years before the McNamara fraud became public knowledge, 
Island Bank, without knowledge of the fraud, loaned $5 million to 
McNamara Realty Corp. ("Realty"),183 a corporation whose shares are 
owned entirely by John McNamara. Island Bank's loan is secured by a 
mortgage on property of Realty that was worth $6 million at the time of 
the loan but, because of a declining real estate market, is presently worth 
only $3 million. In addition, Realty currently has $4 million of unen-
cumbered real estate and $500,000 on deposit in an account at Island 
[W]hether creditors knowingly deal with corporations as [a] unit ... whether 
one debtor was independent of other debtor when certain securities issued; 
whether creditor dealt only with one debtor and lacked knowledge of its rela-
tionships with others; whether interrelationships of group were closely entan-
gled ... whether entanglement of business affairs of related corporations was so 
extensive that the cost of untangling would outweigh any benefit to creditors ... 
presence or absence of consolidated financial statements; difficulty in segregat-
ing individual debtors' assets and liabilities; existence of parent and inter-corpo-
rate guarantees on loans; unity of interest and ownership; existence of transfers 
of assets without observance of corporate formalities; profitability of consolida-
tion at single physical location . . . . 
AugielRestivo, 860 F.2d at 518 (citations omitted). 
Furthermore, because substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy, a court is un-
likely to order it if the result would injure a class of innocent creditors. See id. at 518-19. 
For a general discussion of substantive consolidation, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Structured 
Finance: A Guide To The Principles Of Asset Securitization (2d ed. 1993). 
181. AugielRestivo, 860 F.2d at 519. Similarly, in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the court emphasized the need 
for predictability by refusing to read into an indenture an implied covenant to prevent a 
leveraged buyout. See id. at 1508. 
182. There is also the view that creditors' expectations will change to take forfeiture 
law into account. The fallacy of that view, however, is that the use of civil forfeiture, 
being both infrequent and random, can never reasonably be anticipated by an innocent 
creditor. This should be distinguished from the situation where a new law, or a change in 
the law, itself reshapes the expectations of parties who may be affected by the law. 
183. Although McNamara Realty Corp. is not a real company, the factual scenario 
described above is both typical and representative of the McNamara case and of large 
civil business frauds generally. 
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Bank. Realty therefore is a solvent company, in that its assets exceed its 
liabilities. 
Assume further that a fictitious company, XYZ Credit Corp. 
("XYZ"), is a primary victim of the fraud. XYZ loaned $100 million to 
automobile dealerships owned by John McNamara, but did not lend any 
money to Realty. The automobile dealerships are now insolvent. 
The rights and remedies of Island Bank may be significantly different if 
civil forfeiture law is applied instead of commercial and bankruptcy 
law. 184 The policy question raised, again, is whether in a commercial 
context conflicting bodies of law should be allowed to govern the same 
subject matter, especially when, from the standpoint of innocent third 
parties, the determination of which body of law applies to a given situa-
tion is random. 
In a bankruptcy case involving multiple corporations,18S the separate 
corporate structure of each company is generally respected. Creditors of 
a given corporation are reasonably assured that their right to be repaid 
from that corporation's assets will have priority over the rights, if any, of 
creditors of another, affiliated corporation. Although a bankruptcy court 
may pool the assets and liabilities of separate corporations under the eq-
uitable doctrine of substantive consolidation, decisions such as Augie/ 
Restivo 186 indicate that such power is judiciously invoked. 18' Typically 
such consolidations occur only after a finding that normal corporate for-
malities were not respected and, only then, where innocent creditors 
would not be significantly impaired by that result. 188 
In a civil forfeiture, by contrast, there is no assurance that separate 
corporate identities will be respected. For example, John McNamara ran 
his business through mUltiple corporations, the stock of which he owned 
184. Whether. in a particular instance, the civil forfeiture law rights and remedies will 
require a different result than under commercial/bankruptcy law is immaterial. The sali-
ent point for purposes of this Article is that it may be different, thus creating uncertain 
expectations between the parties, and removing the measure of certainty required for the 
meaningful transaction of business (e.g.. loan agreements). Furthermore, a creditor 
whose claim is secured by collateral valued in excess of the amount of the chum may be 
better off in a forfeiture than in a bankruptcy case, because forfeiture law specifically 
recognizes secured claims of innocent creditors. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2). In addition, 
the creditor would not be subject to the automatic stay in bankruptcy, or to the risk of 
replacement of the collateral for adequate protection. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 362(a), 363, 
364 (1988). Nonetheless, forfeiture law may give sufficiently broad power to the govern-
ment to impose restrictions ifit wishes to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992). 
185. Modem business often is conducted through affiliated corporations, sometimes 
under common control of one person or corporation. In the case against John McNa-
mara, United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, Inc., No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 
16, 1992). McNamara owned stock of dozens of separate corporations through which he 
ran his business empire. 
186. 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988). 
187. See id. at 519-20. 
188. See id. at 518; supra note 180. 
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directly or indirectly through subsidiaries. 189 The government asserted 
that all of the unencumbered assets of these corporations were derived 
from traceable proceeds of the fraud,190 and therefore belong to the gov-
ernment. In effect, through the application of federal forfeiture law, the 
government, like a bankruptcy court, substantively consolidated the 
McNamara empire. The government entertains the unsecured creditors' 
petitions for relief from this large asset pool. To the extent that the gov-
ernment, through these petitions, allocates assets to the unsecured credi-
tors, some creditors will benefit while others suffer. Unfortunately, none 
of the criteria used to guide bankruptcy courts are considered in forfei-
ture actions. The traceability of proceeds, not the separate corporate 
identities or the rights of innocent creditors,191 is the only touchstone of 
analysis. 
As an example, consider Island Bank's $5 million loan to Realty, a 
solvent corporation. In a bankruptcy of Realty, Island Bank would ex-
pect to recover the entire amount of its loan. 192 XYZ, on the other hand, 
will not recover its full loan because its borrowers' (the automobile deal-
erships) liabilities exceed their assets. But in a civil forfeiture, if the gov-
ernment pooled the unencumbered assets of Realty and affiliated 
corporations for the benefit of all the unsecured creditors, both Island 
Bank, based on the $2 million unsecured portion of its loan,193 and XYZ, 
based on its $100 million loan, would have a remission claim against the 
combined assets of Realty and the automobile dealerships. If the value of 
the resultant combined unsecured asset pool is less than the amount of 
the combined unsecured claims of creditors of Realty and the automobile 
dealerships, then each creditor holding an unsecured claim would (as-
suming that the creditor's petition for remission was granted) receive less 
than the full amount of its remission claim. In effect, XYZ would benefit 
unfairly from the pooling of Realty's assets, while Island Bank would 
suffer unjustly from XYZ's claim. 
It is ironic that the creditors hurt the most by a consolidation are those 
who made loans to the most financially sound of the corporate entities 
and unexpectedly find themselves sharing their borrowers' assets with 
creditors of riskier enterprises. The least conservative lenders, on the 
189. See United States v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, Inc., No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. 
July 16, 1992). 
190. The Second Circuit in United States v. Banco Cafetero Panama, 797 F.2d 1154 
(2d Cir. 1986), liberally construed forfeiture's "traceable proceeds" provision to allow 
forfeiture of five separate bank accounts where uncertainty as to the legality of the source 
of the funds existed. See id. at 1159-60; supra note 54. Under recently enacted 18 U.S.C. 
§ 984, Congress has even further expanded forfeiture's reach in cases involving money 
laundering. 
191. See supra part LB. 1. 
192. However, Island Bank will likely suffer a delay in collection because of the auto-
matic stay in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
193. Recall that Island Bank's $5 million loan is secured by collateral presently worth 
only $3 million, leaving a $2 million unsecured deficiency. Its loan therefore is under-
secured by $2 million. 
1993] CIVIL FORFEITURE 313 
other hand, who were able to charge higher interest rates on their loans 
to the less credit-worthy borrowers benefit from the consolidation by 
sharing in the combined asset pool. It is questionable, at best, whether 
forfeiture law should impose this fundamental unfairness. 
4. Forfeiture Undermines Bankruptcy Code Policy Discouraging 
Setoffs 
The Bankruptcy Code by its terms gives creditors a secured claim with 
respect to certain deposit accounts in order to discourage creditors from 
setting off funds in those accounts, and thereby prematurely forcing a 
company into liquidation. 194 To the extent a bank has a borrower's 
funds on deposit in an account, such funds in the event of a bankruptcy 
would become cash collateral for pre-bankruptcy loans made by the bank 
to the borrower to the extent the bank could have set off such funds prior 
to bankruptcy.195 In this way, the Bankruptcy Code harmonizes the in-
terests of the debtor and its estate while protecting the rights of creditors. 
Therefore, in the case of Island Bank, the $500,000 in Realty's deposit 
account with Island Bank would become cash collateral for Island 
Bank's loan to Realty in the event Realty files for bankruptcy. In plan-
ning its workout strategy, Island Bank would be encouraged by the poli-
cies underlying the Bankruptcy Code not to set off the account, and 
might be penalized if it did set off the account. 196 
Unlike the Bankruptcy Code, civil forfeiture provides no apparent pro-
tection for a party having the right to set off funds in the wrongdoer's 
deposit account. Furthermore, under the common law, only mutually 
owing debts can be set off. Therefore, prior to a forfeiture, Island Bank 
would be entitled to offset (ie., retain) the $500,000 deposit balance it 
"owes" to Realty against the outstanding loan Realty owes to Island 
Bank. However, a forfeiture could prevent the setoff because the relation 
back provisions197 provide that all of Realty's assets, including the 
$500,000 deposit account funds, vest retroactively in the United States to 
the time of the criminal act. 198 Because Island Bank would then "owe" 
the $500,000 to the United States and not to Realty, the mutuality of 
indebtedness may be destroyed and Island Bank's common law setoff 
rights may be lost. 
194. See 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988). Indeed, 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 
further discourages premature setoffs by providing that all or a portion of amounts set off 
may have to be returned under certain circumstances specified therein. 
195. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988). 
196. See 11 U.S.C. § 553(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
197. Under the Supreme Court's decision in 92 Buena VISta A~·e. II, 113 S. Ct. 1126 
(1993), Island Bank could still try to assert an "innocent owner" defense and a court 
would have to rule on the merits of the claim prior to the application of the "relation 
back" doctrine. See id. at 1134-37. Although the court held that donees would qualify as 
"innocent owners," it did not address the issue (because it was not presented) of whether 
a bank holding an account subject to set off would possess the requisite "ownership" 
under the "innocent owner" defense. See id. at 1134-35. 
198. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(f); 21 U.S.C. § 881(h). 
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Under this scenario, Island Bank reasonably would want to exercise its 
setoff rights at the earliest possible moment for fear that a civil forfeiture 
action might be commenced. Once Island Bank sets off, it becomes the 
owner of the funds in the deposit account, and therefore trumps the gov-
ernment's interest in the funds. 199 Realty, for its part, would suffer the 
loss of the forbearance Island Bank might otherwise extend if its rights 
were not impaired by a forfeiture. The result would be to precipitate 
Realty's slide into bankruptcy at a time when Realty might have been 
able to avoid a bankruptcy. 
5. Forfeiture May Thwart State Law Remedies 
Assume that prior to forfeiture Realty defaulted on its loan obligations 
and Island Bank moved for and obtained the appointment of a receiver 
for the properties mortgaged to Island Bank. A state court receiver's 
duties typically include the collection of rents, payment of the properties' 
operating expenses, and escrow or payment to the mortgagee of any sur-
plus funds to be applied against the mortgage debt.2°O The appointment 
of a receiver protects Island Bank's interest in Realty's rents as well as 
the interests of other creditors by preventing Realty's principals from 
using the company's assets for improper purposes or personal benefit. 
If Realty subsequently files for bankruptcy, the receiver may, at the 
discretion of the court, continue to perform its duties or be ordered to 
turn over the property to the bankruptcy trustee who would operate Re-
alty's estate for the benefit of all creditors.201 In either event, Realty's 
rents would likely become Island Bank's cash collaterap02 
In a civil forfeiture, the forfeiture order may call for the removal of a 
state court-appointed receiver for the mortgaged properties.203 The fed-
eral court-appointed Special Trustee, responsible for controlling and 
overseeing all of the forfeited property, would replace the state court re-
ceiver.204 While contracts or existing statutes define the duties and obli-
gations of a state court receiver, statutes do not prescribe the role that a 
199. See supra part I.B.3. This assumes that Island Bank is an innocent owner of the 
funds set off. 
200. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 6401(b) (McKinney 1980) (setting forth powers 
of temporary receiver). 
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 543 (1988). 
202. See In re Financial Ctr. Assocs., 140 B.R. 829, 834-35 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992). 
Island Bank's use of the cash collateral would be limited by § 363 of the Bankruptcy 
Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 363. 
203. See, e.g., United States v. McNamara Pontiac-Buick, Inc., No. CV-92-2070 
(E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992) (ordering a decree of forfeiture and appointing a special 
trustee). 
204. Such an order may raise a question under the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2283 (1988), which prohibits federal courts from interfering with certain orders issued 
by a state court. In National Cancer Hospital of America v. Webster, 251 F.2d 466 (2d 
Cir. 1958), cerro denied, 361 U.S. 824 (1959), the Court held that a federal court could not 
enjoin a state court receiver who had been directed by a state court to distribute seized 
monies to certain cancer institutions. See id. at 467-68. 
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Special Trustee will serve in a forfeiture action. Lenders and other credi-
tors have no means to predict how, when, or if a borrower's assets might 
be seized and, once seized, how the Special Trustee will distribute those 
assets to creditors. 
6. Forfeiture May Prevent Creditor Recovery of Preferences and 
Fraudulent Conveyances by Preempting a Bankruptcy Filing 
Under section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code,20s transfers of cash or 
other property made by a company to creditors within 90 days206 of the 
company's bankruptcy may, under certain circumstances, have to be re-
turned as preferential. Furthermore, under section 548 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code,207 transfers made (or obligations incurred) within one year 
of the company's bankruptcy may have to be returned as fraudulent con-
veyances if the company did not receive "reasonably equivalent value" in 
return.20S The congressional intent behind sections 547 and 548 was to 
ensure an equal and fair distribution of a debtor's estate.209 
A civil forfeiture, however, may preempt these important Bankruptcy 
Code provisions. The government asserts that forfeiture gives it title to 
and control of all the assets of a wrongdoer. Therefore, because after 
forfeiture wrongdoers no longer own the stock of corporations previously 
controlled by them, they may not be able to cause bankruptcy petitions 
to be filed for those corporations.210 Involuntary bankruptcy petitions 
also would be stayed by the forfeiture. 
The 90-day period for federal preference actions and the one-year pe-
riod for federal fraudulent conveyance actions211 are therefore likely to 
pass without creditors being able to challenge the transfer as preferential 
or fraudulent. Furthermore, forfeiture law, being federal law, would ap-
pear to preempt any applicable state fraudulent conveyance law.212 
205. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988). 
206. If the creditor is an "insider," the 9O-day period becomes one year. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 547(b)(4)(B) (1988). 
207. 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
208. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2)(A). For a discussion of fraudulent conveyance law and 
its application, see Steven L. Schwarcz, The Impact of Fraudulent Conl"eyance Law on 
Future Advances Supported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 729 (1987); Steven L. Schwarcz & Gabe Shawn Varges, Guarnnties and Other 
Third-Party Credit Supports, Commercial Loan Documentation Guide 16-1 (1989). 
209. See, e.g., In re Antweil, 931 F.2d 689,692 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The most important 
purpose of section 547(b) [of the Bankruptcy Code] is to facilitate equal distribution of 
the debtor's assets among the creditors.") (citing H.R. Rep. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 177-78, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138), aff'd, 112 S. Ct. 1385 (1992); 
In re Weisman, 112 B.R. 138, 140 (Bankr. W.O. Pa. 1990) ("The fundamental purpose of 
the § 548 fraudulent conveyance statute was to protect creditors from transfers of assets 
of the debtor."). 
210. The issue of whether forfeiture preempts bankruptcy nonetheless appears to be 
without legal precedent. 
211. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(4), 548(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). 
212. See United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, 817 F. Supp. 571, 577 n.15 (E.D. Pa. 
1993). 
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Consider, for example, that in the final days of the McNamara empire, 
prior to the revelation of the fraud, McNamara decided to transfer prop-
erty and/or funds to a large creditor, family, or friends in an attempt to 
place such assets beyond the reach of forfeiture. Existing civil forfeiture 
law provides no procedure for creditors to challenge such transfers, plac-
ing creditors at the mercy of the government's decision whether or not to 
institute such a challenge.213 More importantly, to the extent the trans-
ferees are unaware of the fraud, the innocent owner provisions of forfei-
ture law214 would protect the transfers, including those made to donees, 
even if the result of the transfers was to deplete significantly the assets 
left for repayment of innocent creditors. This is in direct contrast to the 
bankruptcy preference and fraudulent conveyance laws.21S These laws 
operate to bring assets transferred in advance of bankruptcy back to the 
debtor's estate to the extent the debtor was insolvent and did not receive 
the requisite measure of value in return for the transfer. 
III. A RECENT MODEL FOR BALANCING GOVERNMENTAL AND 
COMMERCIAL LAW INTERESTS 
In reevaluating civil forfeiture law, Congress should compare the pres-
ent situation with the perceived conflict of interest previously faced by 
another arm of government, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC"), in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1898,216 the predecessor statute to the Bankruptcy Code. 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended, included a broad role for the 
SEC in bankruptcy proceedings.217 The SEC had the right to be 
"deemed a party in interest" and to be heard on all matters arising in a 
bankruptcy proceeding. The SEC served as an advisor and final expert 
for the court, weighing protection of the "public interest" against the 
commercial interests of the parties in the particular bankruptcy case.2lS 
This is analogous to the DOJ's role in forfeiture actions-weighing the 
"public interest" in combating illegal activity against the claims of inno-
cent creditors and other parties to commercial transactions. 
Equally striking in the analogy between the SEC's role in bankruptcy 
and the DOJ's role in forfeiture is the government's conflicting roles in 
each. In re Yuba Consolidated Industries 219 illustrates this conflict. The 
213. It is a curious phenomenon that the government, at times, will at its discretioll 
exempt certain property from forfeiture. For example in United States v. McNamara 
Buick-Pontiac, Inc., No. CV-92-2070 (E.D.N.Y. July 16, 1992), the government excluded 
a private trust and McNamara's estranged wife's house from the Forfeiture Order. 
214. See supra part 1.B.3. 
215. See 11 U.S.C. § 547; 11 U.S.C. § 548. 
216. 30 Stat. 544 (1898). The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 is the predecessor statute to the 
Bankruptcy Code. 
217. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 208 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § l109(a) 
(1988». 
218. See William Miller Collier, Collier on Bankruptcy 11 l109.ot (15th ed. 1993). 
219. 260 F. Supp. 930 (N.D. Cal. 1966). 
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court strongly admonished the SEC for its opposition to a fee application 
by an attorney for a creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding.22o In harsh 
language, the court reprimanded the SEC for its "attitude calculated to 
discourage and stifle individual creditors from actively participating in 
chapter X proceedings-particularly where a creditor aggressively op-
poses the views of the SEC."221 
In the 1978 revision of the bankruptcy laws, Congress re-evaluated the 
SEC's dual role as both advocate and advisor in bankruptcy proceedings. 
Section 1109 of the Bankruptcy Code significantly alters the role of the 
SEC in a chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding by providing that, although 
it may be heard on any issue, it may not appeal from any order entered in 
the bankruptcy case.222 Legislative history explicitly reveals congres-
sional intent that the SEC "not [be] a party in interest. u223 The SEC 
therefore no longer has a statutory right to file a plan of reorganization 
for the debtor's business; that right is reserved for a "party in inter-
est."224 The SEC apparently has accepted this more restricted role, and 
has suggested that it will limit its participation in bankruptcy cases to 
ensuring that disclosure requirements are met. In addition, the SEC will 
intervene if a court so requests or if a particular case will set legal prece-
dent.22s The bankruptcy context thus provides a recent historical prece-
dent where a conflict between protecting the "public interest" and the 
commercial interests of third parties led to restrictions on governmental 
power in order to achieve a more reasonable balance. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
Civil forfeiture law likewise should be reformed to arrive at a more 
reasonable balance between ensuring that wrongdoers do not retain the 
profits of their illicit activity and preserving the legitimate expectations of 
parties to commercial transactions. Although this balance can be 
achieved in various ways, there is one approach to reform that is both 
simple and effective. Forfeiture laws should be amended so that when 
applied to assets not directly used in the illicit activity, only the wrong-
doer's equity in those assets is seized. In other words, the government's 
interest should be limited to the residual portion, if any, that remains 
after innocent creditors have exhausted their rights, remedies, claims, 
and interests under applicable commercial and bankruptcy laws. The 
government would have, in effect, only a contingent springing interest in 
220. See id. at 960-63. 
221. Id. at 962. 
222. See 11 U.S.C. § 1109(a). 
223. See 124 Cong. Rec. S17,419 (daily eel. Oct. 6, 1978) (remarks by Sen. Dennis 
DeConcini) cited in Collier, supra note 218, at 1109-17. 
224. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (1988). 
225. See Collier, supra note 218, at 1109-14 n.32a (quoting Daniel L. Goelzer, General 
Counsel of the SEC). 
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the wrongdoer's assets that are traceable to, but not used directly in, the 
wrongdoer's illicit activities. 
This approach allows the government to uphold legitimate commercial 
expectations while preventing the wrongdoer from retaining profits from 
illicit activity. It also addresses the concerns previously raised by this 
Article. Because the government does not preempt the claims-paying 
process, the procedural protections of commercial and bankruptcy law 
will be applicable. Unsecured claims will be recognized and paid as of 
right. Separate corporate identities will be respected. In addition, credi-
tors will have exhausted their non-forfeiture rights and remedies before 
the government's forfeiture rights mature.226 
Until the forfeiture laws are changed to implement this reform, gov-
ernment forfeiture actions intended to protect the "public interest" inad-
vertently could deny property rights to innocent creditors. The 
government therefore should consider adopting interim reforms of its 
own. First, the government should adopt the claims-paying priorities 
from bankruptcy law to prevent unfairness to creditors. Furthermore, 
unsecured claims of innocent creditors should be paid as of right from 
seized assets. In addition, forfeiture law should respect separate corpo-
rate identities unless there is a reason to "pierce the corporate veil. "227 
As the law currently exists, the government can gather together property 
seized from affiliated corporate entities whose only connection with the 
wrongful conduct is that the property consists of traceable proceeds. 
Although the natural inclination of prosecutors may be to distribute the 
seized property to victims of wrongful conduct, the present law simply 
creates more innocent victims by depriving creditors of their bargained 
for recovery. 
Finally, when innocent parties may be affected, the government should 
use its discretion to seize, at least at the outset, only property directly 
used in the wrongdoing. This not only would bring civil forfeiture closer 
to its historical roots but also would mitigate the disruption of commer-
cial transactions by restricting the property subject to forfeiture. 
Creditors also should be given procedural rights under forfeiture law. 
Creditors are presently confronted by an ad hoc system, devoid of any 
meaningful process, in which the government retains virtually complete 
discretion as to the distribution of seized assets. If the government gave 
creditors the right to be heard after notice, and appointed a representa-
226. Alternatively, the same result could be achieved by amending forfeiture law to 
allow the government to seize the wrongdoer's traceable assets at the outset, but subordi-
nating the government's interest in the seized assets not directly used in the illicit activity 
to the rights, remedies, claims and interests of innocent third parties. Such a provision 
would be enforceable in a bankruptcy proceeding. See II U.S.C. § 510 (1988). The gov-
ernment therefore could not take any action against the "seized" assets until innocent 
creditors exhausted their rights and remedies under non-forfeiture law. 
227. See, e.g., In re Sims, 994 F.2d 210, 217-20 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing when to 
treat three corporate entities as one for purposes of filing an involuntary bankruptcy 
petition). 
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tive group of creditors to advise the government in administering and 
distributing seized property, it would go far to alleviate the frustration 
now felt by unsecured and undersecured creditors. 
This Article suggests that unsecured claims of innocent creditors 
should be paid as of right. Under existing forfeiture law, the mechanism 
for payment is the petition for remission. The petition for remission is in 
need of reform, however, not only because it gives the government discre-
tion whether to pay a claim but also because the government's determi-
nation is not subject to judicial review on the merits.228 Under the 
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), by way of contrast, agency ac-
tion is generally subject to judicial review.229 Normally, the standard of 
review applied to agency determinations permits the reviewing court to 
overrule the agency determination when it is "arbitrary, capricious [or] 
an abuse of discretion. ,,230 
Moreover, the failure to provide judicial review of DOJ determinations 
is exacerbated by the conflict of interest under which the DOJ operates. 
The DOJ, which is the agency that entertains petitions for relief, may 
stand to benefit directly if such petitions are denied. 
Therefore, the petition for remission should be replaced by a proof of 
claim procedure, perhaps similar to that provided under sections 501 
through 502 of the Bankruptcy Code and the related bankruptcy rules. 23 1 
To the extent that the petition for remission has any ongoing viability, its 
function should be limited primarily to the determination of the inno-
cence of creditors who file a claim. In making that determination, the 
government should be subject to the normal standard of judicial review 
of agency action, as described above. 
CONCLUSION 
The state of modem civil forfeiture law reveals a statutory and legal 
web of doctrine that has removed forfeiture not only from its historical 
origins but also from the realities of modem commercial dealings. By 
denying fair treatment of creditors, the application of civil forfeiture stat-
utes threatens to undermine the principles of commercial reasonableness 
and predictability that underlie commercial transactions. Financial insti-
228. At one time, district courts were empowered to remit or mitigate forfeitures. See, 
e.g., Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement Act, 27 U.S.C. § 40a (repealed 1948), cited in 
United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 220-21 (1939). 
229. See 5 U.S.C. § 701-706 (1988). 
230. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988). Although the APA does have a "carve out" for 
instances of "agency action ... committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a)(2), courts have established a three-part test for determining whether an agency 
action fits within this exception. Factors to be evaluated include appropriateness of the 
issues raised for judicial supervision to safeguard the interests of plaintiffs and the impact 
of review on the effectiveness of the agency carrying out its responsibilities. See Hahn v. 
Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243, 1249 (1st Cir. 1970). 
231. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-502 (1988); 11 U.S.C. RuJ. 3001-3022 (1988 & Supp. IV 
1992). 
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tutions and other creditors are subject to forfeiture laws that were never 
intended to apply to them, and that lead to results substantively different 
than would be reached under bankruptcy and commercial law. Civil for-
feiture historically has served, and still retains, a legitimate role in soci-
ety's efforts to ensure that crime does not pay. That goal, however, 
should not be achieved-and indeed need not be achieved-at the ex-
pense of innocent third parties. 
